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1. Introduction
In 2011, The Protecting Canadians by Ending Sentence Discounts
for Multiple Murders Act (MMA)1amended the Criminal Code by
adding s. 745.51.2 This section gives sentencing judges discretion to
“decide that the periods without eligibility for parole for each murder
conviction are to be served consecutively” if “at the time of the
sentencing under s. 745 [...] an offender is convicted of murder and [...]
has already been convicted of one or more other murders.”3 Though
the judge may decide that multiple terms of parole ineligibility will
run concurrently, imposing, in effect, a single ineligibility period, the
provision’s consecutive option opens the door to de facto life
imprisonment sentences without a realistic possibility of release
(hereafter referred to as “lifelong imprisonment”).
Though there has not been a lot of scholarly attention paid to this
issue, a few commentators have raised concerns regarding the fact
that s. 745.51 is incompatible with international human rights, the
direction other jurisdictions have taken, and the Canadian Charter4 of
*

1.
2.
3.
4.

Assistant Professor, JD Criminal Justice Program Coordinator, Schulich
School of Law at Dalhousie University.The author would like to thank
Elaine Craig, Steve Coughlan, Richard Devlin, Tony Doob, Stephen
Fineberg, Andrew Martin, and Kent Roach for their insightful comments
on earlier drafts of this work. I am also grateful for the outstanding and
essential research assistance received from Nicole Kelly (JD ’21) and Allison
Hearns (JD ’22).
The Protecting Canadians by Ending Sentence Discounts for Multiple Murders
Act, S.C. 2011, c. 5 [“MMA”].
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 745.51 [“Code”].
Ibid.
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act,
1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 1
[“Charter”].

312

2021]

R. c. Bissonnette

313

Rights and Freedoms.5 Most recently, Isabel Grant, Crystal Choi, and
Debra Parkes (Grant et al) included a quantitative study of multiple
murder cases in their broader study on parole ineligibility for
murder.6 In their review of 54 multiple murder cases, they raised
concerns regarding the frequency with which consecutive periods of
parole ineligibility were imposed, especially in some jurisdictions.7
Since 2011, s. 745.51 has been applied over 50 times, with nearly
half of the accused being sentenced to what is effectively lifelong
imprisonment. In late 2020, the Quebec Court of Appeal (QCCA)
declared s. 745.51 unconstitutional and struck it down in Bissonnette
c. R.8 In doing so, the QCCA agreed with the trial judge, Justice
Huot,9 in holding that s. 745.51 violates ss. 7 and 12 of the Charter, but
disagreed that it can be saved by reading it down to allow for judicial
discretion in increasing parole ineligibility by any lesser amount (as
opposed to the prescribed periods, such as 25 year blocks for first
degree murders or 10-25 years for second degree murder). The QCCA
also refused to read in a prohibition against applying s. 745.51 to
anyone except the most incorrigible offenders, even if that may
alleviate some constitutional concerns.10 The QCCA held that these
5.

Paul Calarco, “R. v. Bourque: Horrible Crimes, Illegal Sentence” (2014), 15
CR-ART 71 [“Calarco”]; Derek Spencer, “Hope for Murderers? International Guidance on Interpreting the Protecting Canadians by Ending
Sentence Discounts for Multiple Murders Act” (2017), 22 Can Crim Law
Rev 207 [“Spencer, ”Hope for Murderers“”]; Derek Spencer, “Does the
Royal Prerogative of Mercy Offer Hope for Murdered? Further International Guidance for Interpreting the Protecting Canadians by Ending
Sentence Discounts for Multiple Murders Act” (2019), 24 Can Crim L Rev
313 [“Spencer, ”Royal Prerogative“”]; Derek Spencer, “How Multiple
Murder Sentencing Provisions May Violate the Charter” (2019), 55 CRART 165; Mary E. Campbell & David Cole, “Sentencing and Parole for
Persons Convicted of Murder” in David Cole & Julian Roberts, eds,
Sentencing in Canada: Essays in Law, Policy, and Practice (Toronto: Irwin
Law, 2020), at 191-192 [“Campbell & Cole”].
6. Isabel Grant, Crystal Choi & Debra Parkes, “The Meaning of Life: A Study
of the Use of Parole Ineligibility for Murder Sentencing” (2020), 52:1 Ottawa
L Rev 133 [“Grant et al”].
7. Ibid., at 171-174.
8. Bissonnette c. R. (2020), 68 C.R. (7th) 1, 2020 CarswellQue 13124, 2020
CarswellQue 12129 (C.A. Que.), leave to appeal allowed Attorney General of
Quebec, et al. v. Alexandre Bissonnette, 2021 CarswellQue 6391, 2021
CarswellQue 6392 (S.C.C.) [“Bissonnette, QCCA”].
9. R. c. Bissonnette, 2019 CarswellQue 6617, 2019 CarswellQue 750, EYB 2019307088 (C.S. Que.), reversed Bissonnette c. R. (2020), 68 C.R. (7th) 1, 2020
CarswellQue 13124, 2020 CarswellQue 12129 (C.A. Que.), leave to appeal
allowed Attorney General of Quebec, et al. v. Alexandre Bissonnette, 2021
CarswellQue 6391, 2021 CarswellQue 6392 (S.C.C.) [“Bissonnette, QCCS”].
10. Bissonnette, QCCA, supra note 8 at paras. 154-186.
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constitutional issues are far too complex, and the powers required to
ensure that this provision is not grossly disproportionate or
overbroad are beyond what courts may do.11 Rather, it is up to
Parliament to decide if it wishes to rewrite and pass a new provision.
The Crown has appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of
Canada (SCC) and leave to appeal has been granted.12
This article reviews the constitutional arguments upheld by the
QCCA in Bissonnette and weighs them against the challenges that
trial judges have encountered in applying s. 745.51 since 2012. By
drawing on a qualitative review of cases in which s. 745.51 has been
applied, as well as Charter principles, sentencing case law, and
international practices, this article posits that the QCCA was correct
in its approach to s. 745.51, both in finding it unconstitutional and in
finding that the provision should not be read down to render it
constitutional. This article advances the central argument that, in the
context of an already problematic sentencing regime for murder, a
piece of legislation that allows for consecutive periods of parole
ineligibility of any length, even when its application is circumscribed
to certain offenders, will likely continue to raise issues in its
application and effects. It is submitted, therefore, that when
Bissonnette is heard by the SCC, the QCCA’s decision should be
upheld. Moreover, Parliament would be well advised to resist any
attempts to rewrite this provision and pass another version of it.
For the remainder of Part 1, I will provide an overview of the
sentencing regime for murder in Canada. While this article focuses on
consecutive periods of parole ineligibility, many of the issues that
arise from the application of s. 745.51 are not discrete, for the
provision constitutes an aggravation of an already problematic
sentencing regime for murder. After providing this background, I will
set out the methodology used to review and analyze the cases and I
will provide a brief demographic overview of the cases decided under
s. 745.51. In Part 2, I will provide a review of the Bissonnette decisions,
including the trial judge’s reasons and the Charter arguments upheld
by the QCCA. In Part 3, I will embark on a critique of the decisions
and a thematic review of the s. 745.51 cases rendered between 2012
and 2020 to illustrate how the theoretical concerns raised by the
11. Ibid., at paras. 169-186.
12. Supreme Court of Canada, “Docket 39544: Attorney General of Quebec, et
al. v. Alexandre Bissonnette”, Supreme Court of Canada (last updated May
29, 2021), online: 5https://www.scc-csc.ca/case-dossier/info/dock-regi-eng.aspx?cas=395444; Supreme Court of Canada, “News Releases: Judgments to be Rendered in Leave Applications”, Supreme Court of Canada
(May 25, 2021), online: 5https://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/news/en/item/
7160/index.do4.
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QCCA are reflected in the ways s. 745.51 has been applied in practice.
This Part will demonstrate that the QCCA decision is aligned with
both Charter principles and previous jurisprudence, and it responds
to the issues that emerged from the case review. I will conclude by
highlighting the reasons why any version of this provision will likely
continue to raise problems, why the SCC should strike down this
provision, and why Parliament should not attempt to pass another
version of it.

(a) The Canadian Sentencing Regime for Murder
Since 1976, when capital punishment for murder was abolished,
the harshest sentence in Canada has been the mandatory minimum
sentence for first degree murder of life imprisonment without
possibility of parole for 25 years (Life (25)).13 For second degree
murder, the mandatory minimum is also life, but the sentencing judge
has discretion in setting parole ineligibility between 10 and 25 years.14
Eligibility for parole refers to the right of sentence-serving
individuals to have their candidacy for release considered by the
Parole Board of Canada (PBC) after having served a statutorily
prescribed period in custody. This review is normally performed at a
hearing, at which the PBC will decide if the individual presents a
continuing risk that requires them to remain in custody. As just
mentioned, persons convicted of first degree murder must wait 25
years for this moment; for second degree murder, 10 to 25 years. If the
PBC deems they have succeeded in lowering their risk to an
acceptably low level, they may continue to serve their life sentences
in the community subject to conditions and under supervision until
they die, and always vulnerable to re-incarceration should their risk
increase. Release, therefore, is far from guaranteed, and indeed,
many people are not released in response to their first parole
application, while others are never successful.15
The Canadian sentencing regime for murder has been criticized as
harsh and unprincipled.16 Disparity in sentencing has been a regular
13.
14.
15.
16.

Code, supra note 2, s. 745(a).
Ibid., s. 745(c).
Campbell & Cole, supra note 5 at 186-187.
See e.g. Cheryl Marie Webster & Anthony N. Doob, “Principles and Politics:
Sentencing and Imprisonment Policy in Canada,” in David Cole & Julian
Roberts, eds, Sentencing in Canada: Essays in Law, Policy, and Practice
(Toronto: Irwin Law, 2020); Campbell & Cole, ibid.; Allan Manson, “A Trip
from Thoughtful to Thoughtless: Murder Sentencing in Canada,” in Karim
Ismaili, Jane B. Sprott & Kim Varma, eds, Canadian criminal justice policy:
contemporary perspectives (Don Mills, Ont: Oxford University Press, 2012),
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issue for scholarly engagement. For example, the provisions
concerning second degree murder provide judges with discretion in
choosing a period of parole ineligibility of 10 years or more but give
little guidance on how to interpret these provisions, which has led to
heated debates in courts and among scholars regarding how this
discretion should be exercised.17 Moreover, the length of the
mandatory period of ineligibility for first degree murder is one of
the highest in comparable western common law and civil law
jurisdictions.18 The wisdom of imposing a mandatory life sentence
regime has itself been called into question.19 The severity of this
regime is further heightened by the extremely limited access of
persons serving life during their period of parole ineligibility to any
form of compassionate or medical release on any grounds short of
terminal illness (which requires medical proof that the individual has
a few weeks to a few months left to live).20

(b) Methodology for the Case Review and Demographics
For this article, I reviewed all reported cases of multiple murders
between December 2, 201121 and May 27, 2020, as well as any
unreported cases that I could find information on, for a total of 53
cases.22 The reported cases were identified through a Westlaw search.

17.

18.

19.

20.

21.

at 58-78 [“Manson, ”Thoughtful to Thoughtless“”]; Allan Manson, “The
Easy Acceptance of Long-term Confinement in Canada,” (1990), 79 CR (3d)
265 [“Manson, ”Easy Acceptance“”].
See e.g R. v. Shropshire, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 227, 102 C.C.C. (3d) 193, 43 C.R.
(4th) 269 (S.C.C.); R. v. Ryan (2015), 329 C.C.C. (3d) 285, [2016] 2 W.W.R.
437, 607 A.R. 47 (Alta. C.A.), leave to appeal refused 2016 CarswellAlta 979,
2016 CarswellAlta 980, [2016] S.C.C.A. No. 52 (S.C.C.); Nathan Gorham,
“The Effects of Shropshire on Parole Eligibility for Second Degree Murder”
(2002), 1 CR (6th) 324; Campbell & Cole, ibid., at 189-190.
Campbell & Cole, ibid., at 187. See also the comparative table for murder
regimes in comparable Western countries in Barry Mitchell & Julian V.
Roberts, Exploring the Mandatory Life Sentence for Murder (Oxford: Hart
Publishing, 2011), at Appendix A [“Mitchell & Roberts”].
See e.g. Mitchell & Roberts, ibid.; Grant et al, supra note 6; Debra Parkes &
Isabel Grant, “Incarceration without hope is cruel and unusual”, The Globe
and Mail (December 4, 2020), online: 5https://www.theglobeandmail.com/
opinion/article-incarceration-without-hope-is-cruel-and-unusual/4.
Outside of the virtually unavailable Royal Prerogative of Mercy, parole by
exception (s. 121 of the CCRA) is the only form of compassionate release
that exists in Canada, and it specifically excludes from its application (s. 121
(b)) those people serving life who are not terminally it. Corrections and
Conditional Release Act, S.C. 1992, c. 20 [“CCRA”]. On this see Adelina
Iftene, “The Case for a New Compassionate Release Statutory Provision,”
(2017), 54:4 Alta L Rev 929.
The date the MMA came into force.
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22. R. v. Guimond, 2020 CarswellMan 183, 2020 MBQB 63, 163 W.C.B. (2d) 148
(Man. Q.B.) (concurrent) [“Guimond”]; Bissonnette, supra note 9 (consecutive); R. v. McArthur, 2019 CarswellOnt 2057, 2019 ONSC 963, 153 W.C.B.
(2d) 201 (Ont. S.C.J.) (concurrent) [“McArthur”]; R v. Downey, 2019
CarswellAlta 1042, 2019 ABQB 365, 156 W.C.B. (2d) 393 (Alta. Q.B.)
(consecutive) [“Downey”]; R. v. Kyle Sparks MacKinnon, 2019 CarswellOnt
9195, 2019 ONSC 3436, 156 W.C.B. (2d) 508 (Ont. S.C.J.) (concurrent)
[“MacKinnon”]; R. v. Delorme, [2019] 7 W.W.R. 718, 82 Alta. L.R. (6th) 295,
2019 CarswellAlta 2 (Alta. Q.B.) (concurrent) [“Delorme”]; R. v. Salehi, 2019
CarswellBC 1218, 2019 BCSC 698, 155 W.C.B. (2d) 746 (B.C. S.C.)
(concurrent) [“Salehi”]; R. v. Forman, 2019 CarswellBC 3680, 2019 BCSC
2165, 160 W.C.B. (2d) 202 (B.C. S.C.) (consecutive) [“Forman”]; R. v.
Zerbinos, 2019 CarswellBC 1101, 2019 BCSC 584, 154 W.C.B. (2d) 596 (B.C.
S.C.) (concurrent) [“Zerbinos”]; R. v. Berry, 2019 CarswellBC 4026, 2019
BCSC 2362, 162 W.C.B. (2d) 253 (B.C. S.C.) (concurrent) [“Berry”]; R. v.
Millard, 2018 CarswellOnt 22708, 2018 ONSC 7578, 153 W.C.B. (2d) 82
(Ont. S.C.J.) (consecutive) [“Millard”]; R. v. Zekarias, 2018 CarswellOnt
22170, [2018] O.J. No. 6827, 152 W.C.B. (2d) 275 (Ont. S.C.J.) (consecutive)
[“Zekarias”]; R. v. Klaus, [2018] 6 W.W.R. 386, 67 Alta. L.R. (6th) 328, 2018
CarswellAlta 256 (Alta. Q.B.), affirmed 2019 CarswellAlta 2636, [2019] A.J.
No. 1669, 2019 ABCA 483 (Alta. C.A.) (concurrent) [“Klaus”]; R. v.
Mitchell, 2019 Saskatchewan (unreported) (consecutive) [“Mitchell”]; R. v.
Marki, 2018 CarswellOnt 15462, 2018 ONSC 5106, 150 W.C.B. (2d) 200
(Ont. S.C.J.) (concurrent) [“Marki”]; R. c. Hudon-Barbeau, 2018 CarswellQue 1170, EYB 2018-291183, 2018 QCCS 895, 145 W.C.B. (2d) 194 (C.S.
Que.) (consecutive) [“Hudon-Barbeau”]; R. v. Brass, 2018 CarswellMan 590,
2018 MBQB 182, 152 W.C.B. (2d) 589 (Man. Q.B.) (consecutive) [“Brass”];
R. v. Kionke, 2018 CarswellMan 178, 2018 MBQB 71, 147 W.C.B. (2d) 411
(Man. Q.B.), affirmed (2020), 390 C.C.C. (3d) 376, 64 C.R. (7th) 136, 2020
CarswellMan 105 (Man. C.A.) (concurrent) [“Kionke”]; R. v. McLeod, 2018
CarswellMan 217, 2018 MBQB 73, 148 W.C.B. (2d) 110 (Man. Q.B.),
affirmed (2019), 384 C.C.C. (3d) 204, 2019 CarswellMan 933, 2019 MBCA
124 (Man. C.A.) (concurrent) [“McLeod”]; R. v. Kahsai, 2018 Alberta
(unreported) (consecutive) [“Kahsai”]; R. v. Hay, 2018 Ontario (unreported)
(consecutive) [“Hay”]; R. v. Bailey, 2018 Alberta (unreported) (consecutive);
R. v. Millard, 2018 CarswellOnt 2973, 2018 ONSC 1299, 146 W.C.B. (2d) 625
(Ont. S.C.J.) (consecutive) [“Smich”]; R. v. Rogers, 2018 Ontario (unreported) (consecutive) [“Rogers”]; R. v. Granados-Arana (2017), 356 C.C.C.
(3d) 340, 43 C.R. (7th) 255, 397 C.R.R. (2d) 294 (Ont. S.C.J.) (consecutive)
[“Granados-Arana”]; R v. Saretzky, 2017 CarswellAlta 1408, [2017] A.J. No.
831, 2017 ABQB 496 (Alta. Q.B.) (consecutive) [“Saretzky”]; R. v. Garland,
2017 CarswellAlta 2510, [2017] A.J. No. 853, 2017 ABQB 198, affirmed
(2019), 386 C.C.C. (3d) 221, 4 Alta. L.R. (7th) 103, 2019 CarswellAlta 2595
(Alta. C.A.) (consecutive), affirmed 2021 CarswellAlta 252, 2021 ABCA 46
(Alta. C.A.) [“Garland, ABQB”]; R. v. Basil Borutski, 2017 CarswellOnt
21148, [2017] O.J. No. 6876, 2017 ONSC 7762 (Ont. S.C.J.) (consecutive)
[“Borutski”]; R. v. Sharpe, 2017 CarswellMan 29, [2017] M.J. No. 22, 2017
MBQB 6 (Man. Q.B.) (concurrent) [“Sharpe”]; R. c. Ramsurrun, 2017
CarswellQue 11818, EYB 2017-288489, 2017 QCCS 5791 (C.S. Que.),
affirmed 2019 CarswellQue 10800, EYB 2019-334076, 2019 QCCA 2133
(C.A. Que.) and Ramsurrun c. R., 2019 CarswellQue 10781, EYB 2019-
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The unreported cases were identified through a Google search of
“multiple murders” and “s. 745.51”. Next, I compiled basic
information about the reviewed cases in order to understand how
this provision has been applied by looking at: the age, gender and race
of the accused; the jurisdiction in which the case was heard; the year;
the number of convicted murders; whether the murders were first or
334075, 2019 QCCA 2134 (C.A. Que.) (concurrent) [“Ramsurrun”]; R. v.
Wettlaufer, 2017 Ontario (unreported) (concurrent) [“Wettlaufer”]; R. v.
Pasieka, 2017 Alberta (unreported) (consecutive); R. v. Ryan, 2017 Ontario
(unreported) (concurrent); R. v. Rushton, 2016 CarswellNS 952, [2016] N.S.J.
No. 463, 2016 NSSC 313 (N.S. S.C.) (concurrent) [“Rushton”]; R. v. Ostamas
(2016), 329 Man. R. (2d) 203, 2016 CarswellMan 245, [2016] M.J. No. 197
(Man. Q.B.) (consecutive) [“Ostamas”]; R. v. Addison, 2016 CarswellBC
3561, 2016 BCSC 2352, 135 W.C.B. (2d) 401 (B.C. S.C.) (concurrent)
[“Addison”]; R. v. Eichler, 2016 Saskatchewan (unreported) (concurrent); R.
v. Koopmans, 2015 CarswellBC 3345, [2015] B.C.J. No. 2484, 2015 BCSC
2120 (B.C. S.C.), affirmed 2017 CarswellBC 43, 2017 BCCA 10, 135 W.C.B.
(2d) 547 (B.C. C.A.) (concurrent) [“Koopmans”]; R. v. Vuozzo (2015), 1138
A.P.R. 181, 365 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 181, 2015 CarswellPEI 24 (P.E.I. S.C.)
(consecutive) [“Vuozzo”]; R. v. C. (W.G.), 2015 CarswellAlta 721, [2015]
A.J. No. 461, 2015 ABQB 252 (Alta. Q.B.) (Clorina) (consecutive) [“WGC”];
R. v. Butorac, 2015 CarswellBC 3994, [2015] B.C.J. No. 2974, 2015 BCSC
2551 (B.C. S.C.) (concurrent) [“Butorac”]; R. v. Bains, 2015 CarswellBC
3382, [2015] B.C.J. No. 2515, 2015 BCSC 2145 (B.C. S.C.) (concurrent); R. v.
Husbands, 2015 CarswellOnt 7676, [2015] O.J. No. 2674, 121 W.C.B. (2d)
487 (Ont. S.C.J.) (consecutive), new trial ordered on appeal R. v. Husbands
(2017), 353 C.C.C. (3d) 317, 2017 CarswellOnt 11089, [2017] O.J. No. 3795
(Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal refused Her Majesty the Queen v. Christopher
Husbands, 2018 CarswellOnt 2060, 2018 CarswellOnt 2061, [2017] S.C.C.A.
No. 364 (S.C.C.), sentenced concurrently in R. v. Husbands (2019), 451
C.R.R. (2d) 117, 2019 CarswellOnt 19785, [2019] O.J. No. 6073 (Ont. S.C.J.)
[“Husbands”]; R. v. O’Hagan, 2015 Saskatchewan (unreported, publication
ban) (consecutive); R. v. Bourque (2014), 15 C.R. (7th) 52, 1114 A.P.R. 259,
427 N.B.R. (2d) 259 (N.B. Q.B.) (consecutive) [“Bourque”]; R. v. Preeper,
2014 CarswellNS 562, [2014] N.S.J. No. 404, 2014 NSSC 284 (N.S. S.C.)
(concurrent); R. v. Legebokoff, 2014 CarswellBC 2752, [2014] B.C.J. No.
2323, 2014 BCSC 1746 (B.C. S.C.), affirmed (2016), 341 C.C.C. (3d) 293,
2016 CarswellBC 2664, [2016] B.C.J. No. 1999 (B.C. C.A.) (concurrent); R.
v. Haevischer, 2014 CarswellBC 4041, 2014 BCSC 2533, 119 W.C.B. (2d) 101
(B.C. S.C.) (concurrent); R. v. Baumgartner (2013), [2014] 5 W.W.R. 360, 578
A.R. 87, 94 Alta. L.R. (5th) 1 (Alta. Q.B.) (consecutive) [“Baumgartner”]; R.
v. Greenwood, 2012 CarswellNS 344, [2012] N.S.J. No. 266, 2012 NSSC 194
(N.S. S.C.) (concurrent), conviction overturned on appeal R. v. Greenwood
(2014), 315 C.C.C. (3d) 479, 1105 A.P.R. 315, 350 N.S.R. (2d) 315 (N.S.
C.A.) [“Greenwood”]; R. v. Crick, 2012 CarswellOnt 12307, [2012] O.J. No.
4707, 2012 ONSC 5695 (Ont. S.C.J.) (concurrent) [“Crick”]; R. v. W.
(B.D.T.), 2012 CarswellMan 708, [2012] M.J. No. 392, 2012 MBQB 303,
affirmed (2015), 630 W.A.C. 237, 315 Man. R. (2d) 237, 2015 CarswellMan
94 (Man. C.A.) (concurrent); R. v. Cliff (2011), 88 C.R. (6th) 175, 2011
CarswellBC 2289, 2011 BCSC 1177 (B.C. S.C.) (concurrent).
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second degree; the length of the period of parole ineligibility; and
whether the sentences were consecutive or concurrent.
The findings resulting from this first part of the analysis are aligned
with those identified and discussed in detail by Grant et al.23 Thus, I
will only describe them briefly here, to provide context to the
subsequent qualitative analysis. From the 53 cases reviewed, the
accused was male in all but two instances.24 The age at sentencing
varied between 19 (the youngest) and 62 (the oldest). In nearly half
(25) of the cases, the judges imposed consecutive periods of parole
ineligibility. Eighty-nine percent of those who received a consecutive
sentence saw a period of parole ineligibility greater than 25 years
imposed, and 45% received parole ineligibility of, or greater than, 50
years. Sixty-six percent of all accused were convicted of two murders,
25% of three murders, and 9% of more than three murders. Most
consecutive periods of parole ineligibility were imposed where at least
one of the murders was first degree. It was uncommon to encounter
this sentence for second degree murder only, though it did happen.25
A sentence with parole ineligibility of 50 years or more should be
reasonably deemed, in most cases, a lifelong imprisonment
sentence.26 That could be true for some cases with less than 50
years parole ineligibility as well, depending on the age of the
individual at the time of sentencing. Thus, in at least half of the cases,
the accused has been sentenced to a lifelong sentence. In practical
terms, given the challenges in accessing discretionary release and the
shorter life expectancy of incarcerated people,27 it is likely that nearly
all, if not all, of those who received consecutive periods of parole
ineligibility will die in prison before being released.
For the second part of the analysis (which this article will focus on),
I used the content analysis qualitative method to review the
justifications provided by judges in choosing a consecutive or
concurrent period of parole ineligibility, as well as the factors and
circumstances they considered in reaching their decisions. I created
themes that could be observed during the review (such as how judges
defined what a lifelong prison sentence is, how they reflected on the
concerns regarding opportunity for release, what role rehabilitation
23. Grant et al, supra note 6 at 165-174.
24. The accused was a woman in Zerbinos, supra note 22 and Wettlaufer, supra
note 22.
25. Husbands, supra note 22; Rogers, supra note 22; Mitchell, supra note 22.
26. Ramsurrun, supra note 22 at para. 134. This is also the conclusion reached by
the Quebec Court of Appeal in Bissonnette, QCCA, supra note 8 at para. 99.
27. See e.g.: Adelina Iftene & Jocelyn Downie, “End-of-Life Care for Federally
Incarcerated Individuals in Canada” (2020), 14:1 McGill JL & Health 1
[“Iftene & Downie”].
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was attributed in multiple murder cases). In doing so, I aimed to
understand the judicial discourse around this provision, the judges’
views of its role within the broader sentencing regime, as well as any
challenges judges may face in reconciling s. 745.51 with sentencing
principles and other provisions. Many of the patterns observed in the
application of this provision were reflective of the concerns raised by
the QCCA in Bissonnette, and thus their presentation in Part 3 is
intertwined with a critique of the Charter arguments advanced in this
case.

2. Review of the Bissonnette Decisions
(a) R. c. Bissonnette, QCCS, 201928
The trial judge, Justice Huot, found that Mr. Bissonnette entered
the Quebec City Great Mosque and attacked worshippers with two
firearms. He shot 11 people, six of whom died.29 The trial judge also
found that Mr. Bissonnette had been obsessed with killing and suicide
for some time, and that he claimed to have attacked the mosque
because he was concerned about Muslim terrorist attacks.30 Mr.
Bissonnette was initially charged with 35 counts of attempted murder
but pled guilty to six attempted murders and six first degree
murders.31
A sentencing hearing was held to determine the duration of parole
ineligibility for the automatic life sentence that Mr. Bissonnette was
to receive. The Crown asked for a period of parole ineligibility of 150
years, 25 years for each life taken.32 The sentencing judge found this
request outrageous, although s. 745.51 would have allowed for the
imposition of such a sentence. Justice Huot held that even 50 years of
parole ineligibility (stacking two periods for first degree murder)
would be grossly disproportionate.33 Since s. 745.51 only allowed for
the sentencing judge to stack blocks of parole ineligibility, Justice
Huot found it to be in violation of s. 12 of the Charter.34 He wished to
impose a period of parole ineligibility between 35 and 42 years. More
than that, he noted, would deny the accused (then 27 years old) a
reasonable prospect of release in the last years of his life.35 Justice
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Bissonnette, QCCS, supra note 9.
Ibid., at para. 588.
Ibid., at paras. 177-181.
Ibid., at paras. 46-53.
Ibid., at para. 281.
Ibid., at paras. 284-289.
Ibid., at paras. 995-996.
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Huot further held that the s. 745.51 requirement of imposing
consecutive periods of parole ineligibility in blocks of 25 years
violated s. 7 of the Charter, as it was incompatible with the protection
of human dignity as a principle of fundamental justice.36 Justice Huot
held that the provision could not be saved under s. 1 as it was not
reasonably or demonstrably justified and it was not a minimal
impairment of rights.37 Instead of striking it down, however, he read
down the provision so as to allow judges to increase the period of
ineligibility with any number of years they considered appropriate
(not just in blocks).38 He imposed a period of parole ineligibility of 40
years for Mr. Bissonnette.39 Mr. Bissonnette appealed his sentence.

(b) Bissonnette c. R, QCCA, 202040
The QCCA began its decision by noting that the case was not about
the horrific acts of Alexandre Bissonnette, but rather it was
concerned with the constitutionality of a Criminal Code
provision.41 This was an important reminder as the majority of
people to whom s. 745.51 is applied have committed terrible acts, and
Mr. Bissonnette’s were perhaps near the top in terms of the enormity
of the tragedy he caused. It was thus not surprising that the QCCA’s
decision was not popular with the public, and especially among the
members of the Muslim community who were di
rectly affected by the violent and hate-driven actions of Mr.
Bissonnette.42 Yet, regardless of the devastating nature of the acts,
the provisions that apply to them must comply with the Charter and
the broader values embodied by the Canadian justice system.
The QCCA found that s. 745.51 violated s. 12 of the Charter
because it allows for sentences that exceed the natural life span of an
individual, and allows for incarceration without any possibility of
parole past a time when an individual has been rehabilitated.43 The
QCCA rejected human dignity as a principle of fundamental justice,
but nonetheless found that the provision was overbroad and not
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Ibid., at para. 982.
Ibid., at para. 1104.
Ibid., at paras. 1107-1160.
Ibid., at paras. 1193-1197.
Ibid., at para. 1227.
Bissonnette, QCCA, supra note 8.
Ibid., at para. 1.
See e.g. Jonathan Montpetit, “Quebec mosque shooter’s sentence reduced as
Appeal Court finds consecutive life sentences are unconstitutional”, CBC
News (November 26, 2020), online: 5https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/
montreal/court-of-appeal-decision-bissonnette-1.58165084.
43. Bissonnette, QCCA, supra note 8 at paras. 109-112 & 144-150.
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rationally connected to its objective.44 Hence, it was also in violation
of s. 7 of the Charter. The Crown did not advance any s. 1 arguments
to show that the Charter breaches were justified.45 The QCCA struck
down the provision.46

(c) Section 12 Arguments: Parole Ineligibility Encroaching on
Life Expectancy and the Opportunity for Rehabilitation
Section 12 of the Charter guarantees the right of individuals not to
be subjected to any cruel and unusual treatment or punishment.47
Section 12 seeks to prevent sentences that are grossly
disproportionate in their length but also sentences that are, in their
nature, unacceptable.48 Section 12 has often been applied to assess the
constitutionality of mandatory minimum sentences based on what is
now known as the Nur test.49 The SCC in Nur held that there are two
issues that must be addressed when a mandatory minimum sentence
is challenged under Charter s. 12. First, the court must assess whether
the effect of the punishment is cruel and unusual on the individual
making the claim. If it is not, the court must assess whether it is
reasonably foreseeable that the punishment will have a cruel and
unusual impact on other individuals. In either case, the provision will
breach s. 12.50
The trial judge in Bissonnette applied the Nur test to assess the
constitutionality of s. 745.5151 but the QCCA held this was the wrong
approach.52 Section 745.51 does not impose an obligation to order
consecutive periods, rather it grants judges with the discretion to do
so. Hence, “a large part of the exercise described in Nur is irrelevant.”
53
In other words, the complaint against s. 745.51 is not that the judge
44. Ibid., at paras. 151-153.
45. This probably would not have made a difference in the outcome. It would be
very difficult if not impossible for courts to find that a cruel and unusual
punishment could be justified under s. 1. See Allan Manson, “Answering
Some Questions About Cruel and Unusual Punishment,” (1987), 58 CR (3d)
247, at 251.
46. Bissonnette, QCCA, supra note 8 at paras. 184-186.
47. Charter, supra note 4, s. 12.
48. Bissonnette, QCCA, supra note 8 at paras. 76-77. See also Benjamin L.
Berger & Lisa Kerr, “Methods and Severity: The Two Tracks of Section 12”
(2020), 94 SCLR (2d) 235 [“Berger & Kerr”].
49. R. v. Nur, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 773, 322 C.C.C. (3d) 149, 18 C.R. (7th) 227
(S.C.C.).
50. Ibid., at para. 77.
51. Bissonnette, QCCS, supra note 9 at paras. 800-814.
52. Bissonnette, QCCA, supra note 8 at para. 83.
53. Ibid.
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must impose a sentence of a certain length, but that the option of
imposing a sentence dehumanizing in its nature is cruel and unusual.
The QCCA engaged with two arguments as to why s. 745.51 opens
the door to a sentence that is dehumanizing, and thus, is cruel and
unusual. First, any period of parole ineligibility that exceeds the life
expectancy of a person is invariably cruel and unusual.54 The QCCA
posited that imposing a period of parole ineligibility that would lead
to someone being eligible to apply for release well into their 100s is “an
aberration,” “senseless,” “absurd,” and “an order authorizing an
offender to take a step he will never [be able] to take [...] bring[ing] the
administration of justice into disrepute.”55 A provision that provides
an opportunity for the judge to impose a sentence that contemplates
“a possibility that never comes to fruition” is necessarily “an attack
on human dignity,”56 and hence, in violation of s. 12.
The QCCA further held that even where the period of parole
ineligibility does not exceed life expectancy, it will still push the
individual into such an advanced old age that release would be
unlikely, and it is thus dehumanizing. In the opinion of the court,
allowing someone to apply for parole at 90 is no different than when
the parole eligibility date is set past 100, despite being apparently
plausible.57 It is still “chimerical justice.”58 In some cases, even a 25year period will push someone into advanced old age and make their
release unlikely. As the court observed, when this period is further
increased, it will “in almost all cases, make it impossible for the
offender to apply for parole before reaching a very advanced age,
thereby preventing any possibility of the offender re-entering society
as an active member. Depending on the accused’s age, this can also
amount to an early denial of any parole whatsoever while he is
alive.”59
Second, the QCCA intertwined the arguments regarding the length
of sentence and the realistic possibility of release with the overarching
goal of rehabilitation. The QCCA did not find that hope for release, in
and of itself, is a constitutional principle that must be protected.60
However, not allowing someone to apply for parole even if they are
rehabilitated will lead to a grossly disproportionate sentence. Thus,
people must have realistic access to parole, keeping in mind that if
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.
Ibid.,
Ibid.
Ibid.,
Ibid.,

at para. 92.
at para. 93.
at para. 96.
at para. 99.
at paras. 101-103.
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they are not rehabilitated by the time that they are eligible to apply,
the PBC will reject their request.61
The QCCA highlighted that courts should not be asked to
speculate on the likelihood of someone being rehabilitated decades
down the road in order to decide how many decades of parole
ineligibility they should impose. The court acknowledged that even
dealing with one period of parole ineligibility requires a significant
amount of speculation regarding rehabilitative potential. This
exercise becomes even more speculative when it comes to periods of
parole ineligibility longer than 25 years.62 The panel noted that while
there may be some extreme cases where it is possible to anticipate
decades ahead that “a psychopath, serial killer, or incorrigible killer
will never be rehabilitated,” the provision would have to be re-written
to limit its application to those individuals.63 As it stands, s. 745.51
violates Charter s. 12.

(d) Section 7 Arguments: Overbreadth, Arbitrariness, and
Gross Disproportionality
Section 7 holds that “everyone has the right to life, liberty and
security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except
in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.”64 All
parties in Bissonnette agreed with the trial judge’s finding that s.
745.51 infringes the liberty and security of the person.65 In addition to
the regular liberty infringements associated with criminal
convictions, s. 745.51 also violates bodily integrity and causes
severe psychological stress due to the imposition of an irreducible life
sentence. The prospect of dying in prison regardless of any
rehabilitation effort leads to hopelessness, mental deterioration,
and increases the risk of suicide.66
Accordingly, the QCCA’s main task under s. 7 was to determine
whether the legislative provision infringed any principle of
fundamental justice. As the established substantive principles of
fundamental justice are purpose-based (i.e. they take into account
how the impugned provision relates to its purpose), the court began
with an assessment of the legislation’s objectives. The QCCA found
that the purpose of the MMA, and thus of s. 745.51, is to protect
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Ibid., at paras. 103 & 107.
Ibid., at para. 110.
Ibid., at para. 112.
Charter, supra note 4, s. 7.
Bissonnette, QCCA, supra note 8 at para. 117.
Ibid.; Bissonnette, QCCS, supra note 9 at paras. 1011-1016.
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Canadians by prioritizing denunciation and retribution for multiple
murders and allowing judges to punish the most incorrigible
offenders more severely. 67 It also serves the purpose of
acknowledging the value of every life lost.68 After reviewing
Parliamentary debates, as well as the language of the Bill, the
QCCA rejected the idea that one of the MMA’s purposes is to achieve
proportionality in sentencing. Had that been the purpose,
“Parliament would have chosen different means providing for
greater flexibility, even while seeking stiffer sentences.”69
The QCCA found that, in relation to its first purpose, s. 745.51 is
overbroad and grossly disproportionate. It is overbroad because it
applies to all multiple murderers, regardless of their specific
circumstances or whether the individuals are truly incorrigible.70
Furthermore, it is not possible to read this provision in a manner that
restricts its application to the category of people who might fit within
this purpose.71 This would usurp the role of Parliament.72
Section 745.51 was found grossly disproportionate under s. 7 for
similar reasons to those provided in the s. 12 analysis. Specifically,
this provision allows for sentences that prevent an individual from
applying for parole until after death. Additionally, s. 745.51 may lead
to an individual being denied the opportunity to apply for parole until
decades after he has been rehabilitated.73
The QCCA also found that s. 745.51 is not rationally connected to
its second purpose, that of accounting for “every life lost.” Rational
connection is generally part of a s. 1 analysis,74 so presumably, what
the QCCA meant here is that the provision is arbitrary (the lack of
arbitrariness being a principle of fundamental justice),75 as it cannot
achieve its objective. Because human life is limited, it is not physically
possible, “in the vast majority of cases,” to account for each life lost
through the time the individual spends in custody.76

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Bissonnette, QCCA, ibid., at para. 126.
Ibid., at paras. 128 & 135.
Ibid., at para. 133.
Ibid., at paras. 140-141.
Ibid., at para. 140.
Ibid., at para. 169.
Ibid., at paras. 144-147.
R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, 24 C.C.C. (3d) 321, 50 C.R. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.).
Bedford v. Canada (Attorney General), (sub nom. Canada (Attorney General)
v. Bedford) [2013] 3 S.C.R. 1101, 303 C.C.C. (3d) 146, 7 C.R. (7th) 1 (S.C.C.)
[“Bedford”].
76. Bissonnette, QCCA, supra note 8 at para. 143.
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3. Why the QCCA Got It Right: Critique and Thematic
Review of the Application of s. 745.51
(a) Section 12 and Parole Ineligibility Encroaching on Life
Expectancy
(i) Charter S. 12 Jurisprudence
The QCCA in Bissonnette recognized that, under Charter s. 12, the
main issue with s. 745.51 is not that the duration of the resulting
sentence may be excessive compared to the blameworthiness of the
offender. Rather, the defect is that lifelong imprisonment is in and of
itself an unacceptable, cruel type of punishment. Neither the idea that
the nature of a punishment (as opposed to its mandatory length) may
offend s. 12, nor that lifelong prison sentences are cruel and unusual,
is new to the Charter jurisprudence. In both respects, the QCCA’s
decision is very much aligned with previous Charter decisions and
with recent scholarship on this issue.
Benjamin Berger & Lisa Kerr (Berger & Kerr) refer to the
distinction between the severity and the nature of a punishment as the
“two tracks of section 12” and argued that it is crucial that the
analyses for the two tracks be kept distinct.77 In assessing severity
under s. 12, as when it is done for mandatory minimum sentences, a
proportionality analysis applying the Nur test will be required. In
assessing whether the nature of the offence under s. 12 is cruel and
unusual (“the methods track”), “questions of proportionality, the
existence of [judicial] discretion” and “comparisons to the harm
inflicted or the culpability of the offender”78 distract from the real
issue, which is whether the type of sentence itself is unacceptable.
Going as far back as R. v. Smith, the SCC has recognized that both
severity and the nature of the penalty may violate s. 12.79 In R. v.
Lyons,80 the SCC reviewed the constitutionality of indeterminate
sentences (essentially, life sentences that may be imposed when an
individual is designated a “dangerous offender” following
conviction).81 Much as it previously did in R. v. Smith82 and as the
77. Berger & Kerr, supra note 48.
78. Ibid.
79. R. v. Smith, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045, (sub nom. Smith v. R.) 34 C.C.C. (3d) 97,
58 C.R. (3d) 193 (S.C.C.) at paras. 54-57 [“Smith”].
80. R. v. Lyons, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 309, 37 C.C.C. (3d) 1, 61 C.R. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.) at
336-337 [S.C.R.] [“Lyons”].
81. The dangerous offender designation may be imposed on someone who has
committed two or more of the designated violent offences in s. 752 of the
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QCCA later held in Bissonnette,83 the SCC in Lyons found that the
quantum of the sentence is not the only thing that may render the
sentence grossly disproportionate. In fact, in the case of an
indeterminate sentence, it is not the length of detention itself that is
the problem, as much as its “indeterminate quality.”84 Knowing that
the sentence never ends renders this type of sentence qualitatively
different from determinate sentences, even long ones.85 Essentially, in
assessing the constitutionality of indeterminate sentences, the SCC
applied “the methods track,”86 and held that “an enlightened inquiry
[into indeterminate sentences] under s. 12 must concern itself, with the
way in which the effects of punishment are likely experienced.”87
Based on this analysis, the SCC found that the indeterminate nature
of the prison sentence would render it, “at least occasionally” grossly
disproportionate.88 Yet it found that indeterminate sentences do not
breach s. 12 because of the existence of a parole system that provides a
timely opportunity for release to prevent someone from being
incarcerated for longer than their circumstances require. 89 An
individual serving an indeterminate sentence may apply for early

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Code, supra note 2. An individual who receives this designation may be
sentenced to serve an indeterminate sentence. This is a life sentence in that it
never ends. However, someone serving an indeterminate sentence is eligible
to apply for parole after seven years served, and every second year after that
(s. 761 (1)). In practice, very few people serving this type of sentence are ever
released.
Smith, supra note 79.
Bissonnette, QCCA, supra note 8 at para. 109.
Lyons, supra note 80 at 339.
Ibid.
Berger & Kerr, supra note 48 at 2.
Lyons, supra note 80 at 341.
Ibid.
Ibid. More recently, s. 753(1) (establishing the requirements to be met for the
imposition of a dangerous offender designation) was challenged under
Charter ss. 7 and 12 for leading to indeterminate sentences, especially when
lesser measures would suffice for protecting the public (R. v. Boutilier, [2017]
2 S.C.R. 936, 358 C.C.C. (3d) 285, 42 C.R. (7th) 251 (S.C.C.)). The
indeterminate sentences themselves were not in dispute. In citing Lyons, the
majority found that, if read correctly, the judge would have to consider other
options and the application of indeterminate sentences should be limited to
confinement of “habitual criminals who are dangerous to others” (para. 34).
Karakastanis J. in dissent found that in its sole focus on public safety, s.
753(1) is grossly disproportionate and violates Charter s. 12. The dissent held
that judges have no discretion in attributing the dangerous offender
designation and the discretion they do have to impose an indeterminate
sentence is significantly constricted by the “singular focus on public safety”
(para. 91).

328

Criminal Law Quarterly

[Vol. 69

release after seven years served, and, if denied, every second year
thereon.90
In R. v. Luxton,91 the court reviewed the constitutionality of the
mandatory minimum sentence of Life (25).92 The SCC held that the
regime was not so excessive as to outrage the standard of decency and
hence was not grossly disproportionate. This was, at least in part, due
to the realistic chance of early release after 25 years, and to the
additional possibility of seeking permission through a review before
judge and jury, to apply for parole after 15 years, 93 a process created
at s. 745.6 of the Criminal Code, and cynically dubbed by the press, the
“faint hope clause.” The SCC also noted that individuals could also
apply for release on humanitarian grounds or under the Royal
Prerogative of Mercy (RPM).94
Thus, in both Lyons and Luxton, the constitutionality of a lifelong
sentence under s. 12 hinged on the opportunity for review and release.
Much has changed since these cases were decided, both legislatively,
and in terms of available research demonstrating that the existing
release mechanisms do not actually provide a realistic opportunity
for release. The safeguards which coloured the SCC’s reviews in
Lyons and Luxton are unavailable in many cases where consecutive
periods of parole ineligibility are imposed. Moreover, in light of the
changes briefly discussed below, it is unclear whether the mandatory
minimum sentence for first degree murder would itself survive a
Charter challenge today.95
First, individuals serving life sentences have no meaningful access
to the compassionate and humanitarian early release program
created at s. 121 of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act
(CCRA). While other federal prisoners may qualify on several
exceptional grounds to put their case to the PBC in advance of their
ordinary eligibility date, those serving life may make an early
approach only in the case of medically proven terminal illness, and
then, only close to the end, so that the sole benefit on offer is death
outside prison.96 In addition, recent scholarly research, as well as
reports from the Office of the Correctional Investigator (OCI), show
that parole by exception is rarely used in practice and it is a deeply
90. Code, supra note 2, s. 761(1).
91. R. v. Luxton, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 711, 58 C.C.C. (3d) 449, 79 C.R. (3d) 193
(S.C.C.) [“Luxton”].
92. Manson, “Easy Acceptance”, supra note 16.
93. Luxton, supra note 91 at 720.
94. Ibid., at 723-724; Code, supra note 2, s. 745.6(1).
95. For an in depth, recent critique of the mandatory minimum sentences for
murder generally see Grant et al, supra note 6 at 174-176.
96. CCRA, supra note 20, s. 121.
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dysfunctional system.97 The CCRA indicates, and indeed Luxton
itself98 noted this, that those serving life sentences can apply for the
RPM. This is a purely discretionary power of the executive where the
individual has no procedural rights, there are no criteria to ensure a
successful application, and recent research shows that the RPM has
not been granted in the last 15 years.99 Finally, one recalls that the
SCC in both Lyons100 and Luxton,101 was reassured by the
opportunity to apply for permission after 15 years to set aside the
remaining ineligibility period and bring a case to the PBC, the socalled “faint hope clause” under s. 745.6. Yet this program was
abolished for most prisoners in 2011, while those convicted of
multiple murders had been disqualified from applying since 1997.102
Thus, it is fair to say that for prisoners serving life, regardless of their
progress, regardless of the depth of their difficulties, there exists no
avenue which will bring them to serving their sentence outside prison
prior to their statutory eligibility dates.

(ii) Sentencing Jurisprudence
Sentences that encroach on someone’s life expectancy have, at
times, been described by courts as too harsh and misaligned with
Canadian sentencing principles. In Canada, the fundamental
principle of sentencing is proportionality. Section 718.1 states that
a sentence must be proportional to the gravity of the offence and the
degree of responsibility of the offender.103 This principle works in
tandem with restraint, which requires the imposition of the least
restrictive measures that are appropriate in the circumstances.104 For
consecutive periods of parole ineligibility, a third basic notion is at
play: the Criminal Code rule that consecutive sentences may not
97. Iftene & Downie, supra note 27; Canada, OCI, Annual Report of the Office of
the Correctional Investigator 2013-2014 (Ottawa: OCI, 2014), at 31.
98. Luxton, supra note 91 at 723-724.
99. Mark Prieur, Response to Access to Information Request No. A-202000012, Parole Board of Canada (July 20, 2020). See also Spencer, “Royal
Prerogative”, supra note 5.
100. Lyons, supra note 80 at 362-363.
101. Luxton, supra note 91 at 719-720.
102. The abolition of the “faint hope clause” applied to offences committed after
those dates, while access to the 745.6 reviews was severely reduced for those
whose offences were prior. On how s. 745.6 functioned and a brief history
and critique of its abolition see Allan S. Manson et al, Sentencing and Penal
Policy in Canada: Cases, Materials and Commentary, 3rd ed. (Toronto:
Emond Montgomery, 2016), at 636-657 [“Manson et al”].
103. Code, supra note 2, s. 718.1.
104. Ibid., s. 718.2(d). On the principles governing sentencing see generally Allan
Manson, The Law of Sentencing (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2002), at 83-97.
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produce a combined sentence which is unduly long and harsh (i.e. the
totality principle).105
In R. v. M. (C.A.), the SCC reiterated that the totality principle
requires that the cumulative sentence for multiple sentences is not
excessive.106 An excessive sentence is one that is “crushing” and not
aligned with prospects of reintegration and rehabilitation.107 This
will always be the case where the sentence “threatens to encroach
upon – or exceed - the offender’s reasonable life expectancy.”108 More
recently, the Ontario Court of Appeal found that an unduly long or
harsh sentence, as defined by Lamer C.J. in M. (C.A.), not only fails
to reach sentencing goals but it undermines them.109 When the
individual is left without hope of release or rehabilitation, “the
functional value of [the] sentencing principles meets the point of
diminishing returns.”110
One immediately notices that these principles directly conflict with
s. 745.5. Imposing a sentence that exceeds someone’s life expectancy,
regardless of the crime, is the opposite of exercising restraint, and
shows a blatant disregard for the principle of proportionality.111 As
the sentencing judge in R. v. Delorme aptly remarked in refusing to
impose consecutive periods of parole ineligibility, s. 745.51’s conflict
with proportionality and totality is a potential issue with the
mandatory minimum for murder generally. Section 745.51
magnifies this problem.112

(iii) The Role of Lifelong Imprisonment in the Application of
S. 745.51
If an issue with s. 745.51 is the fact that it may lead to sentences that
exceed or come dangerously close to exceeding the life expectancy of
an individual, one may think that interpreting the provision to ensure
it is only applied where the person maintains a reasonable prospect of
release would render consecutive periods of parole ineligibility
105. Code, supra note 2, s. 718.2(c).
106. R. v. M. (C.A.), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 500, 105 C.C.C. (3d) 327, 46 C.R. (4th) 269
(S.C.C.) at para. 42 [“M(CA)”].
107. Ibid. See also R. v. Adams (2010), 255 C.C.C. (3d) 150, 922 A.P.R. 206, 291
N.S.R. (2d) 206 (N.S. C.A.) at para. 21. On this see generally Clayton C.
Ruby, Sentencing, 10th ed. (Toronto: LexisNexis Canada, 2020).
108. M(CA), ibid., at para. 74.
109. R. v. Johnson (2012), 285 C.C.C. (3d) 120, 291 O.A.C. 350, 2012 CarswellOnt
6276 (Ont. C.A.) at paras. 17-20 [“Johnston”].
110. Ibid.
111. Campbell & Cole, supra note 5 at 191. See also Mitchell & Roberts, supra
note 18 at 63-64.
112. Delorme, supra note 22 at para. 91.
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constitutional. Assessing the reasonable prospects of release,
however, may be easier to do in theory than in practice. As
discussed above, the QCCA noted that when it comes to very long
periods of incarceration, the difference between someone having an
option of release 10 years earlier or later may be more of a theoretical
exercise.113 Even 25 years is a formidable period of parole ineligibility
which will bring people up to an advanced old age in some cases; on
top of which in no case is parole guaranteed.114 More than that (and
on occasion, even that) will often result in parole not being a realistic
option, as there is no meaningful difference between, to take QCCA’s
example, someone being eligible for release at 90, or at over 100.
The above discussion could be seen as a conservative
understanding of what entails a lifelong prison sentence. For
instance, Marc Mauer & Ashley Nellis (Mauer & Nellis) use the
term “virtual lifers” for all individuals sentenced to 50 years or more
in prison, even if it is not a life sentence and even when the individual
has the possibility of early release after serving 30 years. One finds
that for these American scholars, “life sentence,” seen as a practical
category, includes terms that are much shorter than a technical life
sentence with eligibility set at 50 years, irrespective of the age of the
offender at the time of sentencing.115
The Mauer & Nellis’s “virtual lifers” definition is attuned with the
realities of living and growing old in prison. Recent scholarship shows
that every incarcerated individual goes through a process of
accelerated aging and consequently, presents the health conditions
of someone 10-15 years older than those in the community.116
Moreover, the mortality reviews conducted by the OCI show that the
average age at death by natural causes for incarcerated people (i.e. not
inflicted by someone else or themselves) is 62.117 Life expectancy in
the community in Canada is 82.118 This means that the vast majority
of incarcerated people will not survive nearly as long as their
113. Bissonnette, QCCA, supra note 8 at para. 96.
114. Ibid.
115. Marc Mauer & Ashley Nellis, The Meaning of Life. The Case for Abolishing
Life Sentences (New York: The New Press, 2018), at 9-10 & 73-74 [“Mauer &
Nellis”]. Also, at least one case applying s. 745.51 found a 50 year period of
parole ineligibility to amount to a lifelong prison sentence, see e.g.
Ramsurrun, supra note 22 at para. 134.
116. See e.g. Iftene & Downie, supra note 27. For a detailed discussion of the
health issues that incarcerated people face see Adelina Iftene, Vulnerability,
Rights and Access to Justice in Canadian Penitentiaries (Toronto: University
of Toronto Press, 2019), at 31-77.
117. Canada, OCI, Annual Report of the Office of the Correctional Investigator
2014-2015 (Ottawa: OCI, 2015), at 23.
118. Statistics Canada, Table 39-10-0007-01 Life expectancy and other elements of
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equivalents in the community, and that it is wrong to use the
community measure in assessing the life expectancy of an individual
serving a lengthy term in custody. If we accept this argument, it means
that the majority of sentences rendered under s. 745.51 impinge
dramatically on the individual’s life and are dehumanizing and
therefore, cruel and unusual. By combining the individual’s age at
sentencing and the duration of the period of parole ineligibility
imposed in the case, it appears that, since 2011, most of those who
received consecutive periods of parole ineligibility119 (and some who
have received concurrent120) have, in effect, received a sentence that
realistically either exceeds or encroaches on their life expectancy.
In reviewing the cases that have applied s. 745.51, a number of
patterns can be observed in the judicial discourse around lifelong
imprisonment and its implications. For instance, it appears that even
the judges who wished to avoid the imposition of consecutive periods
of parole ineligibility which might encroach on someone’s life
expectancy struggled in defining what that is. In many cases, judges
were aware such encroachment should be avoided because that
would be unduly harsh.121 Yet, the manner in which judges
distinguished between what constitutes a sentence of lifelong
imprisonment and what does not is inconsistent at best, and leads
one to believe that asking judges to make this distinction is neither
reasonable nor practical.
For example, in R. v. Forman, R. v. Brass, and R. v. Vuozzo, the
judges use the same argument (i.e. the sentence should not amount to
lifelong imprisonment) to decide on consecutive periods of parole
ineligibility shorter than what the Crown had recommended.122 In
defining what lifelong imprisonment is, however, each judge came to
the life table, Canada and provinces (last updated May 29, 2021), online:
5https://doi.org/10.25318/3910000701-eng4.
119. Bissonnette, QCCS, supra note 9; Downey, supra note 22; Forman, supra note
22; Millard, supra note 22; Zekarias, supra note 22; Hudon-Barbeau, supra
note 22; Brass, supra note 22; Hay, supra note 22; Kahsai, supra note 22;
Smich, supra note 22; Granados-Arana, supra note 22; Saretzky, supra note
22; Garland, ABQB, supra note 22; Borutski, supra note 22; Ostamas, supra
note 22; Vuozzo, supra note 22; WGC, supra note 22; Bourque, supra note 22;
Baumgartner, supra note 22.
120. Guimond, supra note 22; McArthur, supra note 22; Salehi, supra note 22;
Berry, supra note 22; Klaus, supra note 22; Marki, supra note 22; Kionke,
supra note 22; Sharpe, supra note 22; Wettlaufer, supra note 22; Rushton,
supra note 22; Addison, supra note 22; Koopmans, supra note 22; Butorac,
supra note 22; Greenwood, supra note 22; Crick, supra note 22.
121. M(CA), supra note 106 at paras. 73-74; Johnston, supra note 109 at paras.
20-24.
122. Forman, supra note 22; Brass, supra note 22; Vuozzo, supra note 22.
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a different conclusion. In Forman, the judge found that a sentence
which leaves someone in his late 70s by his first parole eligibility date
was a lifelong prison sentence.123 In Brass, the judge found that fixing
a parole eligibility date in someone’s mid-80s amounted to a lifelong
prison sentence, but not if it was set in their mid-70s.124 Finally, in
Vuozzo, the judge held that the possibility of someone being released
at 86 did not amount to a lifelong prison sentence, but at 96 it
would.125 It appears these judges were of the opinion that 10 years
difference at a (very) advanced old age makes a difference in defining
lifelong imprisonment, though their views were inconsistent on the
cut off age. These approaches are in contrast with those of some
judges who, in applying s. 745.51, rejected consecutive periods of
parole ineligibility altogether because they viewed hope for release
early in someone’s life as paramount in sentencing (e.g. Delorme126
and R. v. Kyle Sparks MacKinnon127). For these judges, a reasonable
chance of release meant that the individual must be eligible to apply
for parole at a fairly young age, in their 50s or sometimes even earlier
than that.
Other judges did not believe there was a practical difference
between the chance of release at 70 or at 90. In some cases where even
one period of parole ineligibility would have seen the individual in his
old age by his eligibility date, the judges decided that imposing
consecutive periods would make no difference to the individual but
would send a strong denunciatory message. For example, in R. v.
Garland, the judge noted that there was no difference if an individual
had a chance of release at the age of 79 or 120 and used this as a
justification for imposing a consecutive period of parole
ineligibility. 128 In contrast, Justice McMahon in McArthur
acknowledged that Life (25) will result in a low chance of release
because Mr. McArthur would be 91 in 25 years. He used this fact as an
argument against providing consecutive parole ineligibility periods.
Even though Mr. McArthur was convicted of eight counts of first
degree murder, Justice McMahon felt that a consecutive sentence
would serve no purpose. He emphasized the fact that the main
justification for imposing a long sentence, the protection of the
public, was no longer a consideration because at 91, Mr. McArthur
would not be a threat, even in the unlikely scenario that he would be
123. Forman, ibid., at para. 38.
124. Brass, supra note 22 at paras. 59-62.
125. Vuozzo, supra note 22 at para. 115.
126. Delorme, supra note 22 at para. 93.
127. MacKinnon, supra note 22 at para. 80.
128. Garland, ABQB supra note 22 at para. 35.
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released.129 Justice McMahon’s idea seems to be that if concurrent
periods achieve the relevant sentencing goals, there is no need to
impose an outrageously absurd sentence that even on paper exceeds
the life expectancy of an individual.130 Using this logic, even one
mandatory sentence of Life (25) raises significant issues in some cases,
and this is one reason why, in this author’s opinion, the
constitutionality of mandatory life sentences is in need of review by
the courts.
The individuals discussed in the paragraphs above received
quantitatively and qualitatively different sentences, even though
most judges attempted to reconcile the sentences with the view that
lifelong prison sentences are unduly harsh and thus should never be
imposed. The differences seem to be at least in part due to the judge’s
understanding of what a lifelong prison sentence is and where the line
should be drawn. It should also be noted that many of the other cases
where s. 745.51 was applied did not even engage with concerns
regarding lifelong imprisonment, despite the fact that the sentence
may have amounted to one.131
The patterns observed in the judges’ engagement with the concept
of lifelong imprisonment raise a number of concerns. First, several
judges imposed periods of parole ineligibility that exceeded
someone’s life expectancy, and, in some cases, they did not
acknowledge that they were doing so. Second, the inconsistency
observed in how judges defined lifelong imprisonment is indicative of
how artificial the distinction between what is and what is not a lifelong
prison sentence can be. Asking judges to define lifelong
imprisonment invites assessments of life expectancy that they are
not trained to make. Thus, the QCCA was correct, not just in finding
that s. 745.51 is cruel and unusual, but also in refusing to follow
Justice Huot’s decision to read the provision down to allow judges to
increase parole ineligibility by any number of years.132 While the
QCCA’s stated reason for refusing to do so was based on concerns
around the separation of powers and the proper role of the judiciary,
in light of the practical challenges raised by assessing what a lifelong
prison sentence is, and given the existing mandatory minimum life
sentences for murder, reading it down would not have made this
provision Charter-compliant.
129. McArthur, supra note 22 at para. 95.
130. For a similar argument see Campbell & Cole, supra note 5 at 191.
131. See e.g Baumgartner, supra note 22; Bourque, supra note 22; Ostamas, supra
note 22; Borutski, supra note 22.
132. Bissonnette, QCCA, supra note 8 at paras. 169-186.
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(b) Section 12 and Rehabilitation
The issue of excessive sentences is inherently intertwined with the
goals of rehabilitation and the need to provide individuals with the
opportunity to reform. The QCCA acknowledged this in Bissonnette
by discussing the lack of opportunity for rehabilitation as an issue
that informs a finding that s. 745.51 is grossly disproportionate.133
This approach is attuned to previous Canadian jurisprudence and the
approach other jurisdictions have taken.
Rehabilitation, often referred to as reformation, has been defined
in a penal sense as the goal of fostering better, law-abiding habits by
changing an individual’s inclinations.134 In one of its forms, it claims
that it is an approach to preventing crime and reoffending by
changing people’s attitudes. In another form, rehabilitation is
understood as a harm reduction goal: a penal sentence may not
change offenders but should aim to avoid unnecessary harm resulting
from damaging penalties.135 Regardless, in relation to custody,
rehabilitation often relates to the treatment and programs available
to individuals with the understanding that they will one day be
released back into society. Outside custody, rehabilitation takes the
form of re-socializing (Europe) and reintegration (Canada). The idea
is to help individuals re-enter and become productive members of
society. 136
The sentencing regime in Canada draws upon both retributivist
principles and utilitarian goals, which include rehabilitation.137 One
finds that where sentencing courts are dealing with serious, violent
crimes, it is retributivist ends, and utilitarian goals other than
133. Ibid., at paras. 109-115.
134. Andrew von Hirsch, Andrew Ashworth & Julian Roberts, “Rehabilitation,”
in Andrew von Hirsch, Andrew Ashworth & Julian Roberts (eds), Principled
Sentencing. Readings on Theory and Policy (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009),
at 2. [“von Hirsch et al”]
135. On this see e.g. P. Raynor & G. Robinson, Rehabilitation, Crime and Justice
(Basingstoke: MacMillan, 2005).
136. See e.g. von Hirsch et al, supra note 134 at 2; Shadd Maruna, Making Good:
How Convicts Reform and Build Their Lives (Washington: American
Psychological Association, 2001); Stephen Farrall, Rethinking What Works
with Offenders: Probation, Social context, and Desistance from Crime
(Collumpton: Willan, 2002).
137. Code, supra note 2. For instance, the Code refers specifically to utilitarian
goals such as denunciation, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation at
s. 718. At the same time, proportionality, a retributivist principle that guides
the punishment of the individual according to their moral blameworthiness
and the seriousness of their offence, is the fundamental principle in Canadian
sentencing (s. 718.1). On the goals and principles of the Canadian sentencing
regime, see Manson et al, supra note 102, at 37-132.
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rehabilitation, such as deterrence and denunciation, which command
the courts’ attention.138 This is not surprising; we now have a good
understanding that the rehabilitative value (in the sense of
transforming people into law-abiding citizens and thus preventing
crime) of prison and prison programs are, at best, hard to assess or
limited.139 At worst, prison may in fact harm reintegration goals.140 It
is, thus, challenging to claim that rehabilitation or reintegration can
serve as the main goals of imprisonment. That does not mean they
should ever be completely ignored: indeed, there is a significant body
of literature demonstrating that harsh or long sentences do not deter
crime, despite the fact that deterrence is often identified as a main goal
of sentencing for violent crimes.141 Rehabilitation has an essential
role in pushing back against the notion that harsh punishments will
mitigate the spectre of crime.142
In relation to retributivist goals, the SCC has long emphasized that
these cannot be the only objectives considered in sentencing,
regardless of the seriousness of the crime. In a commentary on R. v.
Smith, Kent Roach noted that a main contribution of this case,
outside of the mandatory minimum sentences discussion, is the fact
that it constitutes an important limitation on using “just dessert or
retributive rationales for punishment.”143 By looking at the impact
138. See e.g. ibid., ss. 718.01-718.04.
139. Francis Allen, “The Decline of the Rehabilitative Ideal” in von Hirsch et al,
supra note 134 at 11-15; Anthony Bottoms, “Empirical Research Relevant to
Sentencing Frameworks: Reform and Rehabilitation” in von Hirsch et al,
supra note 134 at 16-17; Alison Liebling, “The Uses of Imprisonment,” in
Sue Rex & Michael Tonry, Reform and Punishment. The Future of Sentencing
(London: Routledge, 2011), at 111-127.
140. See e.g. Victoria Law, “Prisons Make Us Safer” and 20 Other Myths about
Mass Incarceration (Boston: Beacon Press, 2021); Angela Y. Davis, Are
Prison Obsolete (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2003).
141. . See e.g. Cheryl M. Webster & Anthony N. Doob, Searching for Sasquatch:
Deterrence of Crime Through Sentence Severity, ed. by Joan Petersilia &
Kevin Reitz (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012); Anthony Doob,
Cheryl Webster, & Rosemary Gartner, “Issues Related to harsh Sentences
and Mandatory Minimum Sentences: General deterrence and Incapacitation” (2014), Criminological Highlights at A-3; Anthony Doob & Marie
Cheryl Webster, “Sentence Severity and Crime: Accepting the Null
Hypothesis” (2003), 30 Crime and Justice 143; Daniel S. Nagin, “Criminal
deterrence research at the outset of the twenty first century” (1998), 23 J
Crim Justice 1; Donald Lewis, “The General Deterrence Effect of Longer
Sentences” (1986), 26 Br J Criminol 47; Alfred Blumstein, Jacqueline Cohen,
& Daniel Nagin (eds), Deterrence and Incapacitation: Estimating the Effects
of Criminal Sanctions on Criminal Rates (Washington, DC: National
academy of Science, 1978); Mauer & Nellis, supra note 115 at 136-139.
142. See e.g. Francis T. Cullen and Karen E. Gilbert, “Reaffirming Rehabilitation,” in von Hirsch et al, supra note 134 at 30 [“Cullen & Gilbert”].
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sentences have on individuals and emphasizing the role of offenders’
personal characteristics in sentencing, Lamer J. (as he then was) in his
s. 12 analysis in Smith rejected retributivism as the only foundation
for any sentencing decision.144 As noted by Roach, the concern with
“the continuing treatment of the individual at the hands of the
state”145 and the inclusion of utilitarian values, such as rehabilitation,
in sentencing considerations, show that an assessment of the
constitutionality of a sentence is more than just a review of its
justness. It is also concerned with its humanity.146 Theoretically
grounded in the idea that social and personal circumstances influence
the commission of crimes, rehabilitation has a role to play, at
minimum, in ensuring sentences avoid excessive harm, minimize
suffering, and leave the door open for an individual to change.147 A
sentence that contemplates an individual dying in prison completely
undermines rehabilitative goals.
Rehabilitation has regularly been discussed in Canadian
jurisprudence since Smith, in and outside the context of s. 12. As
mentioned in the previous section, sentencing jurisprudence has
noted that harsh sentences, such as those that encroach on someone’s
life expectancy, will undermine the goals of rehabilitation and
reintegration (and hence they must be avoided). 148 Charter
jurisprudence has noted that the chance of parole is what ensures
that an individual will not spend time in prison long after they have
been rehabilitated and it is thus key in upholding the constitutionality
of life sentences.149 Thus, the availability of at least a theoretical
opportunity of being released once rehabilitated (i.e. once the
punishment is unnecessary because the criminal tendencies have been
minimized or the individual is no longer a threat) informs the
assessment of when a sentence becomes too harsh. It then follows that
preserving some rehabilitative goals for any form of punishment is
essential for it to be found constitutional.

(i) The Role of Rehabilitation in Other Jurisdictions
In illustrating the importance of rehabilitation, the QCCA drew
upon international instruments to which Canada is a party and which
143. Kent Roach, “Smith and the Supreme Court: Implications for Sentencing
Policy and Reform,” (1989), 11 SCLR 433 at 442 [“Roach”].
144. Smith, supra note 79.
145. Roach, supra note 143.
146. Ibid., at 442.
147. Cullen & Gilbert, supra note 142 at 30-31.
148. M(CA), supra note 106 at paras. 71-74; Johnston, supra note 109 at paras.
20-24.
149. Lyons, supra note 80 at 340-341.
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emphasize that all imprisonment regimes must have a rehabilitative
component.150 Even the Rome Statute to which Canada contributed,
and which governs the prosecution of people accused of genocide and
other mass atrocities in the International Criminal Court, allows for a
sentence review after 25 years.151
The approach taken by the QCCA regarding lifelong
imprisonment and rehabilitation is aligned with that of other
western jurisdictions. A notable example is Vinter and Other v.
United Kingdom,152 a case where the European Court of Human
Rights (ECHR) held that a life sentence is incompatible with article 3
of the European Convention of Human Rights153 (the right to be free
from torture and unusual treatment and punishment) if there is no
realistic and predictable possibility of release and an opportunity for
review of the sentence. In other words, the absence of these two
circumstances renders a life sentence for any crime akin to torture. It
is unlikely that some of the sentences rendered under s. 745.51 would
pass this threshold, given that there is no opportunity for sentence
review and the only possibility of release (hardly realistic or
predictable) rests with Canada’s moribund RPM.154
It may also be worth noting here that other western countries have
found options to denounce and account for the harm inflicted by
multiple murders without condemning the offender to an
unreviewable term of lifelong imprisonment. For instance,
Germany has life sentences but, regardless of the number of crimes,
“the prisoner must be given a realistic and legally-based opportunity
to be released.”155 Denmark, Finland, and Sweden also have life
sentences but the longest periods of parole ineligibility are 12 years for
the former two and 18 years for the latter.156 England and Wales have
a judicial body that reviews life sentences after a number of years,
depending on the offence.157 Other countries do not have life
sentences for any crimes, nor do they allow for consecutive sentences
150. Ibid., at 371.
151. Ibid., at 371-372. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July
17, 1998, 2187 UNTS 38544 (came into force July 1, 2002) at Article 110(3).
152. Vinter and Other v. United Kingdom, No. 66069/09 130/10 and 3896/10,
[2016] III ECHR 317 (9 July 2013).
153. Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended by Protocols Nos 11 and 14,
November 4, 1950 (came into force September 3, 1953) at Article 3.
154. On why the RPM would not pass the Vinter requirements see Spencer,
“Royal Prerogative”, supra note 5.
155. Mauer & Nellis, supra note 115 at 87.
156. Ibid., at 88.
157. Catherine Appleton & Ben Grover, “The Pros and Cons of Life Without
Parole” (2007), 47:4 Br J Criminol 597 at 606. For a critique of the
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for multiple crimes. Rather, they allow for a limited increase of the
sentence (which often ranges between 15 to 25 years for murder) to
reflect the commission of the additional crimes.158 Furthermore,
some countries (e.g. Norway) provide a possibility of extending the
term of imprisonment if the individual is deemed dangerous at the
conclusion of the sentence. The state would need to prove this danger
before an extension is granted.159 While international jurisprudence
has no direct bearing in Canada, it is an important reminder that
other western jurisdictions and international forums have also found
lifelong prison sentences that disregard any rehabilitative goals to be
dehumanizing.160

(ii) The Role of Rehabilitation in the Application of S. 745.51
Not surprisingly given the role these concepts still play in Canadian
law and internationally, the issues of rehabilitation and reintegration
were raised regularly in the application of s. 745.51 in the cases
reviewed. However, the judicial discourse and reasoning surrounding
these sentencing goals were as diverse as the individuals rendering the
decisions. In some, the hope for release as a sentencing factor was
raised in connection with the room the court wished to allow for the
importance of rehabilitation, no matter how horrendous the murders
committed. In the cases where rehabilitation was given some weight,
the judges were significantly more likely to impose a concurrent
sentence. In these cases, the judges acknowledged that if individuals
did not actually rehabilitate, when they reached their parole eligibility
date, they would simply not be granted release, so that judges need not
and should not forestall that outcome by imposing a crushing period
of parole ineligibility.161
mandatory life sentence regime in England generally see Mitchell & Roberts,
supra note 18.
158. Ibid. See also Dirk van Zyl Smit & Catherine Appleton, eds, Life
Imprisonment and Human Rights (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2016), Part IV
at 289-351 [“van Zyl Smit & Appleton”]. For the maximum penalties around
the world see NationMaster, “Crime>Punishment>maximum length
sentence: Countries Compared,” NationMaster, online: 5https://www.nationmaster.com/country-info/stats/Crime/Punishment/Maximum-length-ofsentenc4.
159. Mauer & Nellis, supra note 115 at 88. See also Tapio lappi-Seppala, “Life
Imprisonment and Related Institutions in the Nordic Countries,” in van Zyl
Smit & Appleton, ibid., at 461-506.
160. On the ECHR jurisprudence on this issue and the impact it had on
sentencing in Western European countries see van Zyl Smit & Appleton,
ibid., Part III. For a more detailed discussion on how s. 745.51 squares with
the international approaches on lifelong prison sentences see Spencer, “Hope
for Murderers”, supra note 5.
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In MacLeod, for example, the judge specified that it is essentially
impossible to predict whether or not someone will rehabilitate
decades down the road. As a result, assessing rehabilitation is not the
job of the sentencing judge but the job of the PBC which must be
provided with the opportunity to do so after the individual has served
some time in custody.162 In Klaus, the judge referenced the
international recognition of the value of allowing individuals to
retain hope of release in the event of rehabilitation, and noted that
parole ineligibility periods of 50 years or more will almost certainly
extinguish the hope of release. This hope is important because
rehabilitation is more likely when it exists. 163
In contrast, there were numerous decisions where the fact that
concurrent periods of parole ineligibility are still part of a life sentence
was not acknowledged. Instead, judges emphasized retribution and
denunciation in imposing consecutive periods of parole ineligibility,
without meaningful consideration of whether rehabilitation should
carry some weight. In cases such as Borutski,164 Millard,165
Bourque166 and Rushton,167 the judges noted that denunciation,
retribution, and sometimes deterrence ought to be the singular
considerations guiding sentencing given the crimes committed. In
these cases, consecutive periods of parole ineligibility were imposed.
In Downey,168 the judge noted that rehabilitation is less relevant
because the individual was already older and had committed terrible
crimes, hence consecutive periods of parole ineligibility were
justified. This approach is contrasted with that taken by the judge
in McArthur,169 who, as discussed in the previous section, believed
the older age of an individual justified concurrent periods of parole
ineligibility despite the terrible crimes committed.
It is not surprising that some judges would emphasize deterrence
and denunciation, especially for violent crimes. Yet the issue remains
that as long as judges when performing this function are inconsistent
in their views of rehabilitation as a valid goal, the outcomes will differ.
For crimes as atrocious as these, a judge will have a hard time
concluding whether or not someone has rehabilitative potential.
161. McLeod, supra note 22 at para. 36; Sharpe, supra note 22 at para. 23;
Ramsurrun, supra note 22 at para. 172; Klaus, supra note 22 at para. 134.
162. McLeod, ibid., at para. 36.
163. Klaus, supra note 22 at para. 134.
164. Borutski, supra note 22 at para. 134.
165. Millard, supra note 22 at para. 36.
166. Bourque, supra note 22 at para. 52.
167. Rushton, supra note 22 at para. 47.
168. Downey, supra note 22 at para. 93.
169. McArthur, supra note 22 at paras. 94-102.
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Rather, as correctly phrased by some judges,170 the issue is whether
somewhere down the road an offender’s rehabilitative progress
should be assessed with an eye for potential release. In this situation,
allowing room for rehabilitation considerations in the far future does
not depend on the circumstances of the case; it is simply a matter of
principle. Thus, it appears that where the sentencing judge believes
that hope for release and the potential for rehabilitation (even where
very slim) are essential, the judge will not impose consecutive periods
of parole ineligibility. In contrast, judges who believe that
rehabilitation plays an insignificant role in sentencing for very
serious crimes will be more likely to render consecutive periods of
parole ineligibility. This leads to unpredictable and inconsistent
sentences as the difference between being sentenced to die in prison
(or being considered for release in your 70s or 80s) versus being
considered for release in your 40s or 50s might hinge on the judge’s
own stance on rehabilitation as a valid goal for multiple murders
sentences.
The QCCA in Bissonnette was clear that the Charter does not
protect the hope of release, but rather it protects the importance of
rehabilitation as a goal. More precisely, a sentence that allows for the
incarceration of someone past the moment when they have been
rehabilitated is dehumanizing.171 Arguably, this is a significant issue
in the application of any long sentence to be served in prison – whether
25 years or longer. Thus, the issue of the predictability of
rehabilitative potential and of holding someone in prison beyond
the moment where they were rehabilitated may not be unique to s.
745.51. Indeed, it may be just as applicable to even one lengthy period
of parole ineligibility. Yet, approached intuitively, the longer the
sentence, the more likely it is that this phenomenon will be
encountered, as the inaccuracies creeping into the exercise of
assessing the likelihood of rehabilitation down the road increase
with the length of that road (being the effect of the duration of the
sentence or the ineligibility period or both). Given the high degree of
inconsistency seen in assessing what constitutes a lifelong prison
sentence; given the different takes judges have on the role of
rehabilitation; and given the already lengthy mandatory ineligibility
period; Justice Huot’s suggestion of a new duty on judges to increase
that period only to a point which does not encroach on the offender’s
life expectancy would be unlikely to resolve the constitutional issues
identified by the QCCA.
170. See e.g. Delorme, supra note 22 at para. 93 and MacKinnon, supra note 22 at
para. 80.
171. Bissonnette, QCCA, supra note 8 at para. 81.
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(c) Section 7 and the Overbreadth of S. 745.51
(i) Charter S. 7 Jurisprudence
The QCCA found that s. 745.51 violates the principle prohibiting a
criminal provision from being overbroad. Overbreadth becomes a
concern where the law may infringe the life, liberty or security of the
person by being broader than necessary in achieving its objective,
thereby interfering with conduct that has no connection to its
objective.172 One of the purposes of s. 745.51 that the QCCA
identified was the protection of the public by punishing the worst
individuals – psychopaths and those who are incorrigible – more
severely than anyone else.173 There is no reason to question this
finding. The QCCA looked at all relevant factors in assessing the
legislation’s objective (including context, language used, legislative
history, and judicial interpretation).174 This objective was raised a
number of times in Hansard175 and it would, in theory, be aligned
with the principle that those who have the highest degree of moral
blameworthiness should be punished the harshest.176
The QCCA was also correct in finding that the provision exceeds
this purpose and restricts rights more than needed for this objective to
be met. The approach taken by the QCCA is aligned with the
understanding of overbreadth that the SCC has taken in the past.177
For instance, in Bedford, the SCC found that the prohibition of living
on the avails of prostitution is overbroad because it goes beyond the
intended purpose of protecting sex workers from exploitative pimps,
but also impacts those people who help sex workers (like bodyguards
172. Bedford, supra note 75 at 125; Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), [2015] 1
S.C.R. 331, 320 C.C.C. (3d) 1, 17 C.R. (7th) 1 (S.C.C.) at para. 89 [“Carter”].
173. Bissonnette, QCCA, supra note 8 at paras. 126-128.
174. R. v. J. (K.R.), [2016] 1 S.C.R. 906, 337 C.C.C. (3d) 285, 30 C.R. (7th) 1
(S.C.C.) at para. 64; R. v. Moriarity, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 485, 332 C.C.C. (3d) 38,
24 C.R. (7th) 357 (S.C.C.) at paras. 24-30.
175. See e.g. “Bill C-48, Protecting Canadians by Ending Sentence Discounts for
Multiple Murders Act”, 2nd reading, House of Commons Debates, 40-3, No.
96 (November 15, 2010) at 1520 (Mr. Daniel Petit); “Bill C-48, Protecting
Canadians by Ending Sentence Discounts for Multiple Murders Act”, 2nd
reading, House of Commons Debates, 40-3, No. 97 (November 16, 2010) at
1105 (Hon Rob Nicholson).
176. R. c. Vaillancourt, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 636, 39 C.C.C. (3d) 118, 60 C.R. (3d) 289
(S.C.C.) at 645 [S.C.R.]; R. v. Martineau, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 633, 58 C.C.C. (3d)
353, 79 C.R. (3d) 129 (S.C.C.) at 643-648 [S.C.R.].
177. R. v. Heywood, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 761, 94 C.C.C. (3d) 481, 34 C.R. (4th) 133
(S.C.C.); R. c. Demers, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 489, (sub nom. R. v. Demers) 185
C.C.C. (3d) 257, 20 C.R. (6th) 241 (S.C.C.); Bedford, supra note 75 at 125;
Carter, supra note 172 at para. 89.
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and book keepers).178 Similarly, the QCCA in Bissonnette found that
by allowing s. 745.51 to be applied to anyone who has committed at
least two murders, it may be applied to people who are not
psychopaths or who can be rehabilitated.179 While multiple
murders are by nature horrendous crimes, there is no evidence to
suggest that anyone committing multiple murders, irrespective of
their circumstances at the time, will be a danger to society for the rest
of their lives or that they are otherwise incorrigible. Of course, s.
745.51 does not mandate the imposition of consecutive periods of
parole ineligibility for all multiple murders. But the reality remains
that, regardless of the circumstances, judges have the discretion to
impose consecutive periods for anyone who commits multiple
murders, whether incorrigible or not.180

(ii) Overbreadth and the Application of S. 745.51
The QCCA refused to save the provision by reading in limitations
to ensure it only applies to a certain category of people.181 Once again,
it is unlikely that this limitation would have rendered it
constitutional. To illustrate the variations in what judges have
deemed “the worst,” and indeed who deserves consecutive periods of
parole ineligibility, I will turn again to the cases that have applied s.
745.51. The case review demonstrates that trial judges struggle in
assessing the importance of various sentencing factors and their role
in determining whether consecutive or concurrent periods of
ineligibility are warranted. While the role of various aggravating or
mitigating factors is hard to assess without seeing the evidence before
the judge, the patterns that arise upon the review of the information
contained in the sentencing decisions may suggest some inconsistency
in how these circumstances are considered.
Only 20 out of 53 decisions mentioned any specific aggravating
circumstances listed in s. 718.2,182 such as hate crimes (2), murder of a
minor (7), abuse of a position of trust (6), and related to gang or
organized crime (3). Most crimes were committed against an
178. Bedford, ibid., at paras. 139-144.
179. Bissonnette, QCCA, supra note 8 at paras. 139-142.
180. Certainly, overbreadth may be a concern for other sentencing provisions as
well, such as those for second degree murder. The judge may impose
anywhere between 10 to 25 years parole ineligibility, based on the seriousness
of the crime and the blameworthiness of the offender, the upper limit being
reserved for the worst offenders. This can also prove very difficult to assess
in practice and the disparity in sentencing for second degree murder has been
criticized by others (see e.g. Campbell & Cole, supra note 5).
181. Bissonnette, QCCA, supra note 8 at para. 112.
182. Code, supra note 2, s. 718.2.
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acquaintance (38%), with the second most common crimes
committed against a family member (34%). Two cases also
included sexual violence. Even where listed, aggravating and
mitigating factors were not consistently discussed. In most
instances, the decision listed some factors but did not provide a
discussion on how or if they influenced the decision.
Even where the circumstances were discussed, the outcome is not
necessarily predictable because it appeared more influenced by the
role the judge assigned to rehabilitation than by the concrete
circumstances. For example, in Berry and Downey, both accused
were convicted of two murders, at least one of the victims was a child
in both cases, and neither accused had a prior record. Mr. Berry killed
his own children toward whom he was in a position of trust, which is
an aggravating factor.183 Violence against a family member is also an
aggravating factor under s. 718.2(ii). The judge recognized the
atrocities of the crime, but decided that, not being able to assess the
rehabilitative potential of this individual, she would not shut that
door. Rather, she imposed concurrent periods of parole
ineligibility.184
In contrast, the individual in Downey murdered a mother and her
child (not his own, hence no position of trust and no family
relationship). No additional factors were discussed. The judge,
however, did not believe that rehabilitation had a role in such crimes
and, relying on denunciation and deterrence, imposed consecutive
periods of parole ineligibility.185 The distinction between the
sentences for these two cases is, at least on its face, surprising and
hard to explain based on the factors described in the sentencing
decisions. One explanation could be, as discussed in the previous
section, that judges who put weight on rehabilitation will be more
likely to impose concurrent periods of parole ineligibility than those
who do not, regardless of the circumstances. Another explanation,
specific to this example, may be linked to the statistical finding of
Grant et al that, despite the fact that domestic violence is aggravating
under s. 718.2, judges tend to be more lenient when victims are family
members than when they are strangers.186
In addition, in nearly all of the decisions, regardless of the sentence
imposed, the judge held that the manner in which the crime took
place,187 the violence, and the bad character of the offender188 were
183. Berry, supra note 22 at para. 54.
184. Ibid., at para. 69.
185. Downey, supra note 22 at para. 45.
186. Grant et al, supra note 6 at 170.
187. The manner covers basically any form: by knife, by shotgun, during sleep,
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aggravating factors. It is beyond dispute that all of these crimes
(multiple murders of which, generally, at least one is first degree) are
particularly horrendous and raise significant questions about the
offender’s character. But, given their omnipresence in multiple
murder cases, these may be unhelpful factors in distinguishing
between accused persons who are deserving of consecutive rather
than concurrent periods of parole ineligibility. It is, therefore,
surprising that these factors are consistently invoked in consecutive
decisions as if they are distinguishing factors.189
Arguably, even had there been a requirement that this provision be
applied only to a specified category of people who have committed
multiple murders, the result may not have been vastly different in the
cases reviewed. It is unclear how a judge would assess incorrigibility
other than by looking at various sentencing factors such as the
character of the individual and the circumstances of the crime. Yet, as
discussed, these factors are likely unhelpful in distinguishing between
people convicted of multiple first degree murders. In addition,
assessing incorrigibility implicitly invites a qualitative assessment of
the potential for rehabilitation decades down the road, which judges
should not be asked to make.
In conclusion, first, a review of the manner in which sentencing
courts have executed their 745.51 function to date does indeed
disclose the overbreadth concerns the QCCA raised in Bissonnette.
Second, it is questionable whether narrowing the scope of this
provision to apply solely to “psychopaths” and “incorrigible”
offenders would truly mitigate those overbreadth concerns. Third,
the restriction of s. 745.51 to these types of offenders would result in
its application mostly to first degree murders, for which people
already serve most of their lives in prison, with dismal parole
prospects. Given the mandatory ineligibility period for first degree
murder, further lengthy postponement of parole eligibility is likely to
while awake, with preparation, without notice. It is very difficult to identify a
pattern of what “in the manner the crimes took place” means in this line of
jurisprudence. See for example: Forman, supra note 22 at para. 40
(consecutive); Salehi, supra note 22 at para. 51 (concurrent); Sharpe, supra
note 22 at para. 21 (concurrent); Berry, supra note 22 at para. 68
(concurrent); Hudon-Barbeau, supra note 22 at para. 310 (consecutive);
Addison, supra note 22 at para. 34 (concurrent), Butorac, supra note 22 at
para. 20 (concurrent).
188. See for example: McArthur, supra note 22 at para. 93 (concurrent); Downey,
supra note 22 at para. 65 (consecutive); Husbands, supra note 22 at para. 19
(consecutive).
189. See for example: Downey, ibid.; Husbands, ibid.; Forman, supra note 22;
Hudon-Barbeau, supra note 22.
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encroach on individuals’ life expectancy, far more so than would be
the case for most second degree murder cases. Even setting aside other
issues discussed earlier, one is forced to conclude that when dealing
with the Life (25) regime, if a concerted effort is made to alleviate
constitutional concerns by simultaneously restricting application of
the measure to the worst possible offenders and by stacking
ineligibility periods only where it does not encroach on their life
expectancy, the reality is that those two requirements would often be
in conflict with each other. Adherence to either one would violate the
other, rendering the exercise nugatory.

(d) A Final Issue With S. 745.51
There appears to be some inconsistency in how judges defined the
scope of s. 745.51. The QCCA noted, without any explanation, that
“all parties rightly agree that the provision applies regardless of
whether the multiple murders were committed during one and the
same criminal event or during separate events”190 [emphasis added].
It is not clear why this is the right approach.
Section 745.51 states, in what appears to be clear terms, that
consecutive periods of parole ineligibility for life sentences are
available where the individual has already been convicted of another
murder, as opposed to where the two murders are tried together.191
While the legislation appears to refer specifically to the timing of
when the offences are tried, this is aligned with broader Canadian
sentencing practices which generally seem to distinguish between
offences committed in a single transaction and those committed in
multiple transactions (i.e. offences committed over a period of time
and at various locations). In the former scenario, a judge will
normally render concurrent sentences, whereas in the latter they may
render consecutive ones.192 One might think that this distinction
would guide the sentencing outcome in the application of s. 745.51.
Yet very few judges discussed the number of transactions. In
MacKinnon, the judge specifically noted that the number of
transactions is a distinguishing feature in multiple murder cases.193
As MacKinnon involved a single transaction event, Justice
MacDonnell held the period of parole ineligibility must be between
18 to 25 years.194 Similarly, the judge in Zerbinos acknowledged that
190. Bissonnette, QCCA, supra note 8 at para. 65.
191. Code, supra note 2, s. 745.51. On this see Calarco, supra note 5.
192. Manson et al, supra note 102.
193. MacKinnon, supra note 22 at paras. 62-67.
194. Ibid., at paras. 77-79.
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he could apply consecutive periods of parole ineligibility because the
murders in that case did not arise of out the same series of events.195
However, he refused to exercise that discretion and imposed a single
period of parole ineligibility.196 The number of transactions was
discussed in two additional cases, both involving different events and
both used this to justify the consecutive periods of parole ineligibility
imposed.197 In all other cases, the issue of single versus multiple
transactions was not mentioned at all, regardless of whether the
period of parole ineligibility imposed was consecutive or concurrent.
Indeed, if this distinction would have been made in all cases,
consecutive periods of parole ineligibility would have hardly ever
been imposed, since the murders were part of the same transaction
and were tried together in the majority of cases reviewed (47 out of 53
of the cases reviewed).
In February 2021, the Alberta Court of Appeal (ABCA) in Garland
addressed the issue of whether s. 745.51 applies to convictions for
multiple murders tried together or to those that occur subsequent to
another murder conviction. The ABCA noted that the latter was a
“recidivist” interpretation of s. 745.51 and would result in the
provision applying very rarely. 198 The court proceeded with a
statutory interpretation of the language of s. 745.51199 and concluded
that the application of this provision does not hinge on whether the
individual had a prior murder conviction nor on whether the murders
are tried separately or together.200 After reviewing the language and
Hansard, the court concluded that these are non-factors because “put
bluntly, Parliament intended to empower judges with a discretion to
decide if the declaratory objective of sentencing required consecutive
parole ineligibility periods amounting to a ”whole life“ sentence,
whatever the arithmetic. There can be no serious doubt about this
being the intent of Parliament.”201 In other words, it was the ABCA’s
position that Parliament’s intention was to allow judges discretion in
imposing, on a case-by-case basis, a sentence that would effectively
see an individual who committed more than one murder die in prison.
If this position is correct, this argument likely also applies to the
195. Zerbinos, supra note 22 at para. 38.
196. Ibid.
197. Baumgartner, supra note 22 at para. 58; Granados-Arana, supra note 22 at
para. 75.
198. R. v. Garland, 2021 CarswellAlta 252, 2021 ABCA 46 (Alta. C.A.) at para.
46.
199. Ibid., at paras. 50-65.
200. Ibid., at paras. 70-72.
201. Ibid., at para. 103.
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distinction between single and multiple transactions during which the
murders were committed.
The inconsistency with which the timing of the murders was
addressed in s. 745.51 decisions fuels the confusion regarding the
scope of the provision. While the QCCA’s statement in Bissonnette
was not convincing on this issue, the ABCA’s decision in Garland may
have settled the matter. However, if the Garland interpretation is
correct, it would only strengthen the position that s. 745.51 cannot be
saved by reading it down as Justice Huot suggested in the Bissonnette
trial decision. Put differently, if the ABCA’s reading that Parliament
indisputably intended to allow for lifelong imprisonment is sound;
and if, as discussed in this article and in the QCCA decision in
Bissonnette, imprisoning someone without giving them a realistic
opportunity to be released is unconstitutional, then s. 745.51 cannot
be interpreted in a manner that could render it constitutional,
regardless of whom it applies to.

4. Concluding Thoughts
The Bissonnette decision was a long time coming. When the SCC
hears this appeal, it should carefully consider how s. 745.51 accords
with the previous jurisprudence on excessive and harsh sentences; the
concerns raised nationally and internationally about lifelong prison
sentences, and the lack of opportunity for rehabilitation; the newer
body of scholarship on release mechanisms in Canada, and whether
they in fact provide a realistic opportunity for release; the body of
literature discussing the reality and consequences of aging and dying
in prisons; as well as the interplay between the constitutional concerns
raised by s. 745.51 and those raised by the current murder sentencing
regime more broadly.
The SCC should uphold the QCCA’s finding of
unconstitutionality in Bissonnette and strike down the provision as
opposed to reading it down. Nor should Parliament adopt a narrower
version of this provision. As the QCCA pointed out, Life (25) already
means that most individuals will spend the bulk of their life in prison,
and release after 25 years is by no means guaranteed.202 Further, it is
questionable whether the mandatory minimum for first degree
murder (i.e. Life (25)) would still be found constitutional, in light of
new research illuminating the significant issues surrounding release
options and the abolition of the “faint hope clause”. Given this
context, a new s. 745.51, narrower, but still empowering judges to
increase (but not decrease) a mandatory Life (25) sentence, would
202. Bissonnette, QCCA, supra note 8 at para. 99.
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continue to exacerbate the ills besetting an already questionable
regime.
This is not meant to argue that Canada’s sentencing regime should
make no distinction between the taking of a single life and the
commission of multiple murders. Nor can one deny that the latter
entails in most cases a greater level of blameworthiness. Yet the
response to those varying levels should not assail Charter values by
seeking to increase already questionably severe terms of
imprisonment. Some countries have found the solution is to
eliminate the mandatory life sentence for murder; others allow
judges to impose shorter periods of parole ineligibility when they do
render a life sentence.203 Removal of the mandatory sentence for
murder would afford Canadian judges a superior opportunity to
account for individual blameworthiness and make principled
distinctions between the quantity and quality of the harm inflicted
without extending already lengthy periods of parole ineligibility in
defiance of the Charter.
It is beyond the scope of this article to canvas the earnest
discussions others have published of the need for reform of the
sentencing regime for murder, and of the wisdom of mandatory life
sentences generally.204 For the present, I can but insist on the critical
importance for these broader examinations to be consulted and
respected during any future legislative or policy debate touching on
narrower variations of the present s. 745.51.

203. This is also something that the QCCA seems to suggest in passing, as a
recommendation for Parliament to consider. Ibid., at para. 185.
204. See e.g. Grant et al, supra note 6; Campbell & Cole, supra note 5; Mitchell &
Roberts, supra note 18; Manson, “Thoughtful to Thoughtless”, supra note
16; Manson, “Easy Acceptance,” supra note 16; Mauer & Nellis, supra note
115.

